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Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to demonstrate how a subset of methods from Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) in combination 
with Social Network Analysis (SNA) can be used to analyse the effects of a reduced crew in a legacy system of a commercial 
airliner’s two-pilot-crew operations. Whereas existing research approaches have used different methodological approaches 
such as classical workload evaluations, we focus on social organisation and cooperation at early conceptual design stages. A 
case study of Reduced-Crew Operations (RCO) in commercial aviation highlights how Work Domain Analysis, Control Task 
Analysis and Social Organization and Cooperation Analysis were applied to allocate functions and identify future automation 
requirements. Furthermore, the SNA shows the possible interactions in future RCO. The effect of technological failure on 
the network architecture’s resilience is also explored. A proposal on how to react to a data-link outage and break-up in RCO 
is made with respect to limitations in technology. In this way, the work can foster identifying automation requirements and 
related possible failures at early stages in the design process.
Keywords Cognitive work analysis · System of systems · Single-pilot operations · Social network analysis · Resilience
Abbreviations
AH  Abstraction hierarchy
Arr  Arrival
ATC  Air traffic control
ATM  Air traffic management
ATPL  Airline transport pilot license
CAT  Contextual activity template
CNPC  Control and non-payload communications
ConTA  Control task analysis
CPL  Commercial pilot license
ConOps  Concept of operations
Cru  Cruise
CWA  Cognitive work analysis
CWA-DT  Cognitive work analysis design toolkit
Dep  Departure
EAST  Event analysis of systemic teamwork
GS  Ground station
HCD  Human-centred design
MCO  Multi-crew operations
PF  Pilot flying
PM  Pilot monitoring
RCO  Reduced-crew operations
SME  Subject matter expert
SNA  Social network analysis
SOCA  Social organisation and cooperation 
analysis
SOCA–CAT  Social organisation and cooperation analy-
sis contextual activity template
STA  Strategies analysis
UAV  Unmanned aerial vehicle
WCA  Worker competencies analysis
WDA  Work domain analysis
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1 Introduction
With an increase in automation in various complex socio-
technical systems, reducing human operators has become 
a hot topic in many domains. In seafaring, ships’ crews 
have been decreased despite the fact that the mechanical 
and electronic systems on-board have become more and 
more complex (Bertram 2005). Remotely commanded civil 
vessels are already anticipated (Levander 2017). The crews 
of military vessels, such as the British Type 26 frigate or 
the US-American USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000), have been 
reduced (Wetteland et al. 2000). In commercial aviation, 
the flight crew has been reduced since the 1950s from 
five to two crewmembers. The flight engineer’s profession 
most recently disappeared in commercial aviation (Boy 
2016). Their duties of monitoring all aircraft systems and 
fuel management have been assigned to an electronic flight 
management and the two remaining pilots.
This evolutionary development in (de-)crewing is one 
basic factor of a system of systems (Maier 1998). Like-
wise, aviation shows all the characteristics of a complex 
sociotechnical system (Harris and Stanton 2010). It is 
characterized by an operational and managerial independ-
ence of elements [development, production, aircraft opera-
tions, maintenance and Air Traffic Control/Management 
(ATC/ATM) are offered by different companies/provid-
ers], possesses emergent behaviour, and has a geographi-
cal distribution of elements. Nonetheless, a set of com-
mon operating principles and international regulations for 
design and system operations keeps it safe. The aviation 
sociotechnical system has developed over decades and now 
has a legacy of evolving and adapting to developments 
in technology and human factors. It has been argued that 
reducing the crew from two pilots to one pilot would be 
the logical next step (Harris 2007; Lachter et al. 2017; 
Stanton et al. 2016a). Currently, whilst different crewing 
configurations and concepts have been proposed, there is 
a general consensus that this would include ground-based 
assistance by a remote-operator and remote-pilot as illus-
trated subsequently.
Different theoretical analyses have opposed and 
excluded the option of a single-piloted airliner without any 
ground-based support very early in research’s time course. 
The system resilience in terms of network architecture suf-
fers compared to an option including one remote copilot at 
a ground station (GS; Stanton et al. 2016a). Other system-
theoretic approaches to accident modelling have agreed in 
the trend that support by a remote-copilot to a single-pilot 
can be advantageous over the current crewing configura-
tion and other options of distributing the crew. Examples 
are rapid decompression (Revell et al. 2018), a laser attack 
(Schmid and Stanton 2018), and a hypothetical Kegworth 
accident scenario (Harris 2018). A series of empirical 
studies has investigated different setups of GSs including 
a ground operator as either super-dispatcher or remote-
copilot providing support to multiple or one single-pilot 
aircraft in different situations (Lachter et al. 2017; Vu 
et al. 2018). In general, this type of support seems viable 
for future commercial Reduced-Crew Operations (RCO). 
Without any support, workload on a single-pilot dramati-
cally increases and subjective measures of safety and per-
formance significantly decrease (Bailey et al. 2017).
The procedures and practices of workers in these RCO’ 
systems are not yet fully developed, it is most likely to be 
based (at least in part) on contemporary Multi-Crew Opera-
tions (MCO) in commercial airliners. Hence, we do not pro-
pose to design and analyse a first-of-a-kind-system (Naikar 
et al. 2003; Roth and Mumaw 1995). Rather, we propose to 
design a system whose analogues to older existent system 
designs will remain. Consequently, present research aims to 
reduce its crew in line with the legacy of the aviation system 
as it continues to evolve. The crew reduction concept should 
fit within the existing environment of commercial aviation, 
which is shaped by a multi-structured organisation of hier-
archical control, from regulators such as international and 
national aviation authorities, to airlines and their crews to 
aircraft and their manufacturers, ATC, and airports (Schmid 
and Stanton 2018; Schmid et al. 2018). MCO and RCO will 
need to coexist for the foreseeable future, as they are gradu-
ally introduced and evolve.
Since aviation has developed as a legacy system, a radi-
cal change of its overall structure is unlikely. Only some 
aspects of crew, aircraft and the related infrastructure will 
be adapted to the requirements of RCO. A single-piloted 
commercial airliner will most likely comprise of similar 
systems found in contemporary commercial aircraft. Novel 
automation technologies will be required and the role of the 
pilot requires a re-conceptualization (Harris 2007). Hence, 
it is vital to employ a system-wide approach when analysing 
and designing for crew reduction.
The present paper introduces a subset of well-established 
methods which are used to refine the crew reduction con-
cept. The case study of RCO in which the copilot on-board 
is reduced exemplifies the application of the methodology. 
The framework of Cognitive Work Analysis (CWA) is used 
in combination with a Social Network Analysis (SNA) to 
allocate functions to the different (remaining) human and 
non-human agents of the sociotechnical system. This com-
bination of methods provides first insights in a possible loss 
of system functions at the beginning of a detailed design 
process.
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1.1  Methodological approaches to reducing 
the crew
Reducing the crew of operators of a sociotechnical system 
has already been investigated using different approaches. 
The human-centred design process was applied to the pro-
totype of the guided missile destroyer of the United States 
Navy USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) (Hagan et al. 2011; Quin-
tana et al. 2007). The process included a selection of off-
the-shelf technologies, a cognitive task analysis, 3D visu-
alization aids for modelling and simulation, and empirical 
test simulations using the NASA-TLX (Hart 2006). Not all 
methods yielded positive results. For example, a discrete-
event task network simulation model of the impact of human 
interaction in a land attack fire support mission showed that 
workload was too high for a small watchteam (Wetteland 
et al. 2000). These procedures were cost-intensive (Hagan 
et al. 2011). Due to a lack of viability of initial designs, 
additional crew or changes in its composition were required. 
This shows the usefulness of conducting early evaluations 
(Stanton et al. 2016a). It is essential that all function alloca-
tion decisions are based on a robust methodology to guide 
analysis and design of new systems.
Human Factors and Ergonomics provide many methods 
which support design and analysis of complex sociotechni-
cal systems throughout the whole design lifecycle (Stanton 
et al. 2013, 2014b, 2017). For example, CWA is a structured 
framework to analyse such systems by identifying the pur-
poses and constraints in support of work boundaries (Jen-
kins et al. 2009; Naikar 2006; Rasmussen et al. 1994; Read 
et al. 2015b; Stanton and Jenkins 2017; Vicente 1999). In 
this way, the method aims to foster safer and more effective 
system performance in a variety of situations. CWA con-
tributes to most and various human factors design issues 
(Stanton et al. 2017) among which are establishing a Con-
cept of Operations (ConOps; Bodin and Krupenia 2016), 
function analysis (Millen et al. 2011; Stanton and Bessell 
2014), normal and emergency situations, function allocation 
(Jenkins et al. 2008), training needs analysis (Fleming and 
Pritchett 2016; Kilgore and St-Cyr 2006; Lintern and Naikar 
2000), operating procedures specification (Stanton and Jen-
kins 2017), design advice (Salmon et al. 2016), and interface 
design (McIlroy and Stanton 2015; Stanton et al. 2016b). In 
this connection, the term ConOps refers to defining roles 
and responsibilities of the principal human operators, the 
automation tools used by them, and the operating procedures 
for human–human and human–automation interactions (Bili-
moria et al. 2014).
CWA has been shown to be beneficial in designing new 
systems or integrating new technology in existent systems. 
It supports system design and analysis at all phases of the 
system’s life cycle (Naikar and Sanderson 2001; Sander-
son 2003). In general, CWA consists of five phases: (1) 
Work Domain Analysis (WDA), (2) Control Task Analysis 
(ConTA), (3) Strategies Analysis (STA), (4) Social Organi-
sation and Cooperation Analysis (SOCA), and (5) Worker 
Competencies Analysis (WCA). The method has become a 
standard analytic framework in designing complex socio-
technical systems (Stanton et al. 2017). In the present case 
study, we focus on WDA, ConTA and SOCA which were 
used to investigate some of the likely effects of reducing the 
crew in commercial aviation.
1.2  Methodology: cognitive work analysis (CWA) 
and social network analysis (SNA)
Based on the latest approach to CWA (i.e., including SNA 
to investigate team cooperation and organisation: Houghton 
et al. 2015), we propose an approach to examine the likely 
effects of crew reduction in complex sociotechnical systems. 
Whilst the current system has already been operated for dec-
ades, its crewing characteristics limit further developments. 
The overall organisation of system components will not 
change but new advanced automation of how information 
is processed and displayed in inter- and intra-organisational 
boundaries will define the ConOps. Hence likely behav-
iours of workers within the system can be anticipated from 
the previous system organisation. Against this background, 
legacy issues will be always apparent in reducing the crew 
of an existent system.
We start at the specific following stage in the design pro-
cess as outlined in ISO 9241-2010 (ISO/TC 159/SC 4 Ergo-
nomics of human–system interaction 2010) and the CWA 
Design Toolkit (CWA-DT; Read et al. 2015a, 2016, 2018). 
The ISO/TC 159/SC 4 represents an industrial norm for 
human-centred design principles throughout the life cycle 
of computer-based interactive systems whereas the CWA-
DT is a design approach on how to practically include CWA’ 
results into the design process itself. The ISO norm is used 
during the design process and describes its main stages and 
iterations whereas the CWA-DT provides tools on how these 
results can further be integrated into the future design pro-
cess. We begin at the stage where we have already decided 
that the crew of an airliner will be reduced by the copilot and 
supported by a ground-based remote-copilot due to the rea-
sons outlined above (Harris 2018; Revell et al. 2018; Stanton 
et al. 2016a; Vu et al. 2018). We introduce a CWA-based 
technique to evaluate a specific design concept against pos-
sible system failures of new technology on theoretical level 
to proceed with detailed design. It represents a cost-effective 
procedure to early tailor the system to its later application.
1.2.1  Cognitive work analysis (CWA)
In reduced crewing, we consider a concept design in keeping 
with the evolutionary development process. This includes 
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other initial research approaches and current advances in 
automation. Various studies have already evaluated automa-
tion tools for RCO empirically concluding such operations 
including ground support are viable in near future (Battiste 
et al. 2018; Lachter et al. 2017; Vu et al. 2018). Other pro-
posals have validated advanced automation tools for MCO, 
which autonomously monitor and evaluate pilot health as 
well as hazardous of entries into aircraft (Çakır et al. 2016; 
Gateau et al. 2018; Gaultier and SAFEE Consortium 2008; 
Hanakova et al. 2017; Laviv and Speijker 2007; Maiolo et al. 
2017; Oliveira et al. 2012; Schmitt et al. 2010). In addition, 
concepts for ground support of a single-piloted airliner all 
point to the use of ground-based remote-copilots (Vu et al. 
2018). Analyses suggest that an equivalent resilience in 
network architecture terms may be reached (Stanton et al. 
2016a) when checking, surveilling and monitoring activities 
of MCO are distributed between automation and ground per-
sonnel (Harris et al. 2015; Huddlestone et al. 2017). A single 
pilot without any support can become rapidly overloaded 
in emergency situations (Bailey et al. 2017; Harris 2018).
Based on preliminary considerations of commercial 
RCO, the change in (de-)crewing requires one remote-copi-
lot at ground per single-piloted aircraft for high-workload 
situations as well as off-nominal events and emergencies. 
Our analysis starts with these assumptions as a high-level 
ConOps. We recommend consulting at least one Subject 
Matter Expert (SME) during and after analysis, which can 
be complemented by observation of the work context in the 
current operating system. At first, a WDA of the existing 
sociotechnical system is conducted to formally model the 
current work domain. It describes the constraints of the 
workers’ behaviour that are given by its purposive and physi-
cal context of operation (Stanton and Jenkins 2017). Here, 
the corresponding Abstraction Hierarchy (AH) is consid-
ered at each level to identify the legacy issues (Harvey and 
Stanton 2014). The entire work domain is outlined by an 
analyst-defined boundary on five levels of abstraction that 
are explained subsequently top down. First, functional pur-
poses simply describe the reasons why the system exists. 
Second, values and priority measures represent the measures 
for determining how well the system is achieving its goals 
above. Third, the purpose-related functions are the general 
functions of the work system that are required to progress 
toward its overall goals. Fourth, the object-related processes 
represent the processes that are conducted by the physical 
objects beneath to achieve the purpose-related functions 
above. Last, the physical objects describe the elements that 
are controlled by agents of the system.
As second step, a ConTA is undertaken to look at the 
agent-independent work functions in each situation of the 
current system under operation. The current control tasks 
can be adopted or changed depending on work functions of 
the new automation tools. In general, nothing new was added 
to this phase of CWA (Lamoureux et al. 2006; Lamoureux 
and Sartori 2007; Naikar et al. 2006). The Contextual Activ-
ity Template (CAT) is used as preferred tool for representing 
the control tasks which result from the execution of work 
functions in different recurring classes of work situations. 
It is further elaborated in the following step.
Third, the SOCA is applied to allocate functions to the 
agents of the reduced-crew system. The SOCA-Contextual 
Activity Template (SOCA–CAT) describes how tasks are 
distributed between the different resources of social and 
technical agents. It focuses on team communication and 
cooperation, and is useful for considering dynamic alloca-
tion of function (Stanton and Jenkins 2017). Furthermore, it 
served as a design advice for additional automation systems 
on-board of a single-piloted aircraft and at the GS. The team 
communication and cooperation of SOCA are analysed to 
understand the effects of address loss of functions that may 
arise from technical failures of infrastructure and new auto-
mation tools.
1.2.2  Social network analysis (SNA)
Last, SNA is applied to the SOCA to evaluate the new crew 
composition in context of possible failures in team interac-
tions due to a loss of communication links. The application 
of new technology into a sociotechnical system can always 
introduce new potential sources for hazardous operations 
leading to off-nominal situations or emergencies (Burian 
2008). Hence, three network architectures of possible team 
interactions in following systems configurations are con-
structed from the SOCA–CAT: the current existent system 
of MCO as baseline, RCO as they are supposed to work, and 
RCO containing a loss of distinct work functions which are 
defined by the analysts in a technical malfunction incident 
scenario (Houghton et al. 2015). All SOCA–CAT interac-
tions were derived and plotted in matrices representing the 
social network.
In this step, we considered all work functions to involve 
all safety critical components of the sociotechnical system. 
In particular, new automation technology can create new 
types of incidents that are critical to system safety. These 
can rapidly lead to off-nominal or emergency situations, 
such as when outage or failure occurs. SNA can be used to 
assess the network’s resilience against such situations that 
arise from a loss of technological or communication work 
functions. SNA provides parameters to describe the whole 
network and the agents’ characteristics within it (Wasser-
man and Faust 1994). These metrics were calculated to 
compare the different networks as well as certain agents 
within and between the networks. Non-directed inverted 
weights are used for calculation since they represent inter-
actions. Subsequently, we introduce the most important 
measures with reference for their interpretation. Density 
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measures the network’s group cohesion as fraction of pos-
sible ties present in the network. It takes values between 0 
and 1 and can be interpreted as the rate of participation of 
all agents in the network (Driskell and Mullen 2005). The 
network’s agents themselves are described by following 
nodal statistics of centrality and prestige:
• Degree centrality CD’(ni): the proportion of the num-
ber of nodes an agent is connected to. A high value 
indicates an active agent that is directly or indirectly 
interacting with many other agents.
• Closeness centrality CC’(ni): the inverse sum of the 
geodesic distances from one agent to all others. It 
measures how quickly an agent can interact with all 
others to access information. It describes how close 
that agent is located to all other agents.
• Betweenness centrality CB’ni): the ratio of all (geo-
desic) distances between pairs of nodes which run 
through the node of interest. It indicates how often an 
agent is located between two other agents. It is a meas-
ure of potential control and assumes that communica-
tion occurs along the shortest possible path.
• Eccentricity centrality (Harary Graph Centrality) 
CEcc’(ni): the inverse of the largest geodesic distance 
between a given node and any other node. It describes 
how close a node is located to every other node, i.e., to 
the middle of the network
• Information centrality CI’(ni): an index of the propor-
tion of total information flow that is controlled by one 
agent. The metric includes all paths between agents 
weighted by strength of tie and distance.
• Page Rank Prestige PR’(ni): this measure ranks the 
importance of each agent based on the structure of 
incoming links and the ranks of the connected nodes.
There are several software tools available for SNA to 
calculate and visualize the parameters of the network 
(Huisman and van Duijn 2012). We used the Social Net-
work Visualizer (SocNetV) Version 2.3 (Kalamaras 2015a, 
b) which is based on the standard reference of Wasserman 
and Faust (1994).
The case study of an airliner’s reduced crew demonstrates 
how this approach provides a useful set of techniques to 
analyse a system at early developmental stages of a new 
system. It focuses on a system whose work domain is already 
defined well but is altered to save costs and efforts driven 
by advances in technology. It integrates and connects two 
well-established methods of SNA to CWA to emphasize the 
potential of the rather neglected CWA phase of SOCA as 
design advice (Baber et al. 2017; Houghton et al. 2015). In 
doing so, the investigation of a possible loss of work func-
tions is incorporated into SOCA, referring to a systems net-
work’s resilience. Thus, this set of methods can be used to 
refine and specify a selected ConOps to support detailed 
design issues before prototyping implementation.
2  A case study of reduced‑crew operations 
in commercial aviation
The most common approach to consider RCO for com-
mercial flights is to establish a remote ground support that 
assists the single-pilot during such high-workload situations 
(Bilimoria et al. 2014; Harris 2018; Lachter et al. 2017; 
Stanton et al. 2016a; Vu et al. 2018). In combination with 
a ground (aircraft systems’ software) mirror the distributed 
crewing concept can be at least as resilient as current MCO 
in terms of the network’s architecture of possible interac-
tions (Stanton et al. 2016a). All concepts for RCO including 
any type of ground support require a reliable and secure 
high-bandwidth data-link (Driscoll et al. 2017). No data-link 
can be completely reliable which is why the system has to be 
designed to withstand disturbances. This issue becomes even 
more relevant because a data-link failure on-board might 
coincide with a loss of the human single-pilot’s capability. 
Consequently, any possibility to recover from such type 
of incident must be anticipated and developed. Additional 
advanced automation tools are required to recover from pilot 
incapacitation in general, a data-link outage or break-up, 
as well as a coincidence of both events together. Data-link 
outage and break-up have not been investigated for RCO yet. 
Thus, we aimed to allocate functions in RCO specifically 
to tackle pilot incapacitation as well as a possible data-link 
failure. We integrated the most resilient concept for RCO, 
including ground support (Stanton et al. 2016a) together 
with proposals for advanced automation tools (e.g., Gaultier 
and SAFEE Consortium 2008; Schmitt et al. 2010). This 
served as a basis for our RCO ConOps at early design stages. 
In addition, we compared the design concept’s resilience to 
contemporary MCO and a data-link failure. The objective of 
this final evaluation was to include possible concerns with 
the reliability of the communications and data-link infra-
structure. In fact, data-link resilience (or the lack of it) might 
become a limiting factor in RCO development.
The case study was selected to evaluate a pre-exist-
ing concept of reducing the crew of a system (including 
advanced automation tools) with issues in interactions, 
such as a data-link outage. This set of methods is appropri-
ate for the beginning of a detailed design process (Harris 
2018; Stanton et al. 2016a) to refine further detailed design 
requirements for single subsystems (ISO/TC 159/SC 4 Ergo-
nomics of human-system interaction 2010). It involved one 
SME at very early stages into the design process. A commer-
cial pilot of a bigger European airline (28; male) reviewed 
and validated all results of the present case study, after he 
had received an introduction to the method. He holds a CPL 
 Cognition, Technology & Work
1 3
(Commercial Pilots Licence) and a frozen ATPL (Airline 
Transport Pilot License) having had an experience of 1800 
flight hours of which 1400 were undertaken in a Boeing 
747–800. In addition, he is a certified aerospace engineer 
familiar with current research topics. His suggestions were 
included into the results. The CWA tool (Version 1.00) was 
used to support all steps of CWA (Jenkins et al. 2007).
2.1  Work domain analysis (WDA)
System analysis and design of commercial RCO builds on 
current MCO in which the FO would be displaced to ground 
whereas the Captain remains on the flight deck. Retrofitting 
current aircraft models would not be economically viable 
because the whole flight deck needs to be equipped with 
a ground override system (Driscoll et al. 2017). Hence, 
the development of a new aircraft model enables adding 
novel automation tools to recover from all possible hazard-
ous events on-board of the single-pilot aircraft. There are 
many types of technical incidents and failures (Bailey et al. 
2017; Harris 2018) usually characterized by high workload 
as well as human-related incidents like pilot incapacitation, 
homicide–suicide (Kenedi et al. 2016), and terrorist attacks. 
Consequently, we adapted the WDA of MCO by Stanton 
et al. (2016a) by the addition of the purpose-related function 
of “Recover” (Fig. 1). This function must fulfil three pur-
poses: pilot health monitoring, aircraft systems monitoring, 
and passivation to be able to deal with these incidents. We 
illustrate each of these functions with a reference to vali-
dated system prototypes.
Pilot health monitoring refers to one of the five legacy 
issues which have to be solved in RCO (Johnson et al. 
2012). It should prevent a loss of control due to an in-flight 
incapacitation in RCO. In general, a system that moni-
tors physiological parameters as indicators for the single-
pilot’s physiological health state is required to assess his 
cognitive capacity (Bilimoria et al. 2014). This system is 
supposed to detect a decrease in physiological parameters 
and an incapacitation. Current solutions are less matured 
and further research is needed to elaborate them for actual 
use on-board of an aircraft (Çakır et al. 2016; Gateau et al. 
2018; Liu et al. 2016; Maiolo et al. 2017; Oliveira et al. 
2012).
Aircraft systems’ monitoring refers to assessing behav-
ioural actions regarding control of the aircraft such as entries 
into aircraft systems and control actions. Hazardous system 
operations such as terrorist attacks or an attempted pilot 
homicide–suicide (Kenedi et al. 2016) falls among these 
behavioural hazards. These operations would jeopardize 
flight safety which is why they should be detected and pre-
vented (Etschmaier and Lee 2016). For example, the EU-
project SAFEE (Security of Aircraft in the Future European 
Environment) provided technologies which tackle hazard-
ous human flight operations in MCO (Gaultier and SAFEE 
Consortium 2008; Laviv and Speijker 2007) and could be 
transferred to RCO as well. The on-board threat detection 
system detects unauthorized access to the aircraft such as an 
attempt to hijack or crash the aircraft. The threat assessment 
and response management system assesses the detected inci-
dent and recommends an appropriate response action. The 
prototype was tailored to a few validation scenarios in MCO. 
Nonetheless, initial efforts have been made to specifically 
define a system’s architecture and corresponding variables 
which limit human inputs to a safe range dependent on the 
Fig. 1  A detail of the Abstrac-
tion Hierarchy (AH) of current 
commercial aviation operations 
with the elements added to 
enable Reduced-Crew Opera-
tions (RCO; in white)
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status of the aircraft and environment (e.g., Etschmaier and 
Lee 2016; Etschmaier et al. 2014a, b).
In this way, an airliner is protected against critical human-
made incidents including terroristic acts. Followed by an 
evaluation control can be automatically switched to ground 
to land the aircraft safely at an adjacent airport. A passiva-
tion system passivates aircraft systems and allows it to land 
automatically at an adjacent airport. Technologies as used 
for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) could be applied 
in this case. In SAFEE (Gaultier and SAFEE Consortium 
2008; Laviv and Speijker 2007), an emergency avoidance 
system was foreseen for this purpose. A flight reconfigu-
ration function of the subsequent EU-project SOFIA (Safe 
automatic flight back and landing of aircraft; Bueno et al. 
2010) complemented it by enabling a safe and automatic 
return to ground. In connection, a ground operator can either 
monitor or support the procedures.
All three RCO work functions require pilot health moni-
toring devices as new physical objects for technical imple-
mentation. Hence, we added them on the fifth level of the 
AH. The basic infrastructures of a (quad-redundant or bet-
ter) ground override system on-board of the single-piloted 
aircraft and a data-link via C-band satellite system (Driscoll 
et al. 2017) are inherent in the means-ends links of the AH. 
The ground override system would have, as partially shown 
in Fig. 1 links into many locations of most physical objects 
(and aircraft systems). The GS of the remote-copilot will 
access and operate the same systems of the single-piloted 
airliner via a satellite data-link which is why they are not 
listed separately. This AH represents the work domain of 
imaginable future RCO including current technological 
developments.
2.2  Control task analysis (ConTA)
The ConTA of MCO by Stanton et al. (2016a) was adopted 
and extended by the three novel work functions of pilot 
health monitoring, aircraft systems monitoring, and passi-
vation. The CAT is represented within the SOCA–CAT in 
the next section of SOCA (Fig. 3). All other work functions 
remained to fulfil the purpose-related functions of aviate, 
navigate, communicate, manage and warn. Hence, all con-
trol tasks related to them are not changed. Only the exten-
sion of WDA by the purpose-related function of ‘recover’ 
is required in addition of the three functions named above. 
All three are conducted in all flight phases to detect, assess 
and recover from any off-nominal or emergency situation. 
For example, pilot incapacitation can occur during the whole 
flight requiring permanent (automated) health monitoring 
to enable a recovery. The same accounts for any hazardous 
human operations. Consequently, the affiliated passivation 
systems are also available during whole operations.
2.3  Social organisation and cooperation analysis 
(SOCA)
In contrast to MCO, the copilot is displaced to ground at a 
GS. He remotely monitors and operates aircraft functions. 
This loss in the crew’s redundancy requires a new high-level 
ConOps to refine the function allocations of the control tasks 
in RCO. A dedicated support by this remote-copilot is the 
common approach to tackle high workload and emergency 
situations in RCO (Bilimoria et al. 2014; Lachter et al. 2017; 
Stanton et al. 2016a; Vu et al. 2018). High workload charac-
terizes the departure and arrival phases of flight (European 
Commission 2015; Federal Aviation Administration 2001) 
which is why we allocated mandatory support by a remote-
copilot (Fig. 2).
A related specialist ConOps is the so-called harbour pilot 
concept (Vu et al. 2018). A remote-copilot can complete 4–6 
arrivals for one single-piloted aircraft successively which 
makes it a viable ConOps especially for busy hub airports 
(Koltz et al. 2015). They conducted monitoring functions, 
including communication management and navigation 
in half of the trials whereas they took over the duties of a 
pilot flying in the other half. In this way, the harbour pilot 
offered expertise knowledge and support in aircraft-related 
information depending on current environmental conditions. 
In the present study, the single-pilot remains in command 
and control of the aircraft whereas the remote-copilot keeps 
monitoring functions in normal operations.
The detailed function allocations for normal operations 
are represented in the SOCA–CAT of RCO in Fig. 3. During 
cruise the single-pilot operates the aircraft alone. Lavatory, 
eating, checking on abnormalities, and any activity breaks 
are classified as off-nominal: “any situation that is out of the 
idealized norm of NextGen operations with the exception of 
emergencies” (Burian 2008). In these situations, the remote-
copilot would supervise aircraft automation and take over 
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urgent single-pilot’s work functions. Hence, the remote-copi-
lot is not depicted during cruise in the normal SOCA–CAT. 
Off-nominal situations also cover missed approach and 
delays in ground operations due to bad weather. Off-nominal 
situations are out-of-scope of the present paper. If an off-
nominal situation persists or an emergency occurs an emer-
gency landing is prepared at the start of an arrival phase. The 
SOCA–CAT (Fig. 3) is applicable to all these situations in 
which command and control remain with the single-pilot. 
In case of a loss of control by the single-pilot the remote-
copilot overtakes all of the single-pilot’s work functions to 
land the aircraft. Therefore, the remote-copilot is involved 
in the function of passivation, which includes taking over 
control in emergencies.
Optional support of distributed team(s) (members) has 
already been suggested by several researchers (Harris 2018; 
Schmid and Korn 2017; Stanton et al. 2016a). For example, 
the engine manufacturer could supply support to the single-
pilot in case of engine failures (Harris 2018). This belongs 
to real-time engineering support which would be located at 
the level of the aircraft (and engine) manufacturer (Schmid 
and Korn 2017; Stanton et al. 2014a). The same accounts for 
an imaginable pilot support program which could support 
health issues during flight. Such scenarios are anticipated 
but represent an exception; hence they are out-of-scope of 
the present paper.
An initial and very broad view on possible workload 
complements SOCA. This workload assessment is a rather 
formative approach to give initial insights (Stanton and Jen-
kins 2017). Table 1 lists the total amount of object-related 
processes each agent potentially conducts per flight phase. 
The object-related processes represent the work functions 
that are conducted by the physical objects to perform the 
purpose-related functions. Figure 3 lists all object-related 
process as work functions in detail per flight phase and 
agent(s). In general, only the values of total object-related 
processes of the remote-copilot for in-flight incapacitation 
are slightly higher. This indicates caution in future inter-
face and procedure design but cannot be evaluated any 
further yet. It would require human-in-the-loop simula-
tions to assess workload it in detail. A first quantification 
of workload in commercial SPO with convenient high fidel-
ity flight simulations of the current cockpit interfaces and 
systems confirmed an increase in workload accompanied 
by a decrease in safety and performance compared to MCO 
(Bailey et al. 2017). Nonetheless, the crews and single-pilots 
could deal with all failure modes during flight. It emphasizes 
the need for new advanced automation tools as discussed 
above. A SNA regarding the network’s resilience in RCO 
further illustrates how safety can be compromised in RCO 
without ground support.
2.4  Social network analysis (SNA)
The loss of functions of all ground-based support which can 
occur due to a data-link outage or complete failure has to be 
investigated because this technology provides the safety crit-
ical components of RCO. The support by a remote-copilot 
and possible other teams is essential to overcome the loss 
of redundancy of a second pilot on-board. Hence, a loss of 
this redundant functionality which was built in to compen-
sate the legacy issues like pilot incapacitation impacts the 
whole sociotechnical system. Its overall resilience against 
all types of failures would change which is why it has to be 
considered early in the design process.
We considered all possible interactions in MCO (from 
Stanton et al. 2016a) and RCO to compare them to the pos-
sible interactions during a data-link outage in RCO. Table 2 
shows the functional loadings of all scenarios retrieved from 
the SOCA–CAT (Fig. 3). The functional loadings represent 
the sum of object-related processes/work functions on one 
agent retrieved from the SOCA–CAT. In other words, they 
estimate the amount of different work functions occurring 
simultaneously for one agent. The network of RCO shows 
a comparable density in sum across all flight phases. We 
subdivided them into three main sections to focus on the 
function allocation made for RCO. The higher density of 
RCO in departure is due to the additional automation tools 
in combination with the remote-copilot. The single-pilot 
shows slightly higher functional loadings in cruise in which 
he operates the aircraft on his own. The higher loadings of 
aircraft automation reflect the addition of advanced automa-
tion tools for pilot health and aircraft systems’ monitoring 
as well as passivation. In sum, MCO and RCO’s network’s 
descriptive values remain similar to each other in normal 
operational conditions.
A data-link break-up decreases the network density in 
all sub-phases of flight except departure. In departure, den-
sity remains equal but shows much higher functional load-
ings of the single-pilot in case of a data-link loss. The issue 
of workload due to many more work functions becoming 
the single-pilot’s responsibility is apparent across all flight 
phases in the data-link outage scenario. The lower density 
of this network in RCO indicates lower network resilience 
in comparison to normal MCO and RCO. It characterizes an 
emergency situation due to high workload on the single-pilot 
in combination with a loss of redundant recovery options 
provided by remote-support. It includes all new advanced 
automation tools. Hence, we further consider the nodal 
statistics to understand the agents’ altered position in RCO 
when the data-link fails. Hereby, we used visual analysis to 
Fig. 3  Social Organisation and Cooperation Analysis Contextual 
Template (SOCA–CAT) representing the function allocation in 
Reduced-Crew Operations (RCO). Please refer to online reference for 
readability
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compare the standardised SNA metrics of the three differ-
ent system configurations on a high-level (Houghton et al. 
2015).
Table 3 shows the nodal statistics for the most impor-
tant agents in MCO, RCO and the corresponding data-
link loss scenario across an entire flight. The Pilot Flying 
(PF; MCO) and single-pilot (RCO) can interact with all 
other agents being located close to them [degree centrality; 
CD’(PF) = 0.21; CD’(Single-pilot) = 0.22; closeness cen-
trality; CC’(PF) = 1.95; CC’(Single-pilot) = 1.89], have the 
same potential control over information [betweenness cen-
trality; CB’(PF) = 0.00; CB’(Single-pilot) = 0.00], are close 
to every other agent [eccentricity centrality; CEcc’(PF) = 1; 
CEcc’(Single-pilot) = 1], control the same percentage 
of information [information centrality; CI’(PF) = 0.12; 
CI’(Single-pilot) = 0.12], and are most important [PageR-
ank prestige; PR’(PF) = 1; PR’(Single-pilot) = 1]. In data-
link break-up, the single-pilot is located much more in the 
middle of the network [CC’(PF data-link) = 3.21], can more 
quickly access information [CD’(PF data-link) = 0.46], 
and controls more information [CI’(PF data-link) = 0.15]. 
This characteristic is twofold because the single-pilot can 
react more quickly to any environmental condition but can 
become overloaded in case of data-link loss. Therefore, 
data-link break-up can be defined as an emergency in RCO 
(Burian 2008) since a loss of control resulting from high 
workload without any recovery option is undesirable.
Table 2  Functional loadings 
of the entire flight scenario 
for multi-crew operations and 
reduced-crew operations in 
normal operations and data-link 
break-up
A zero indicates that it is possible or required to contact the given agent under the network options. Thus, 
the agent is included into network calculations. A dash indicates that it is impossible and not planned to 
contact the agent under the given option. Thus, the given agent is excluded from network calculations
a The functional loadings of data-link break-up were calculated by omitting all control tasks of the remote-
copilot in Fig. 3
Options
Functional loadings
Multi-crew operations 
(currently)
Reduced-crew operations (future option)
Normal operations Data-link break-up a
All Dep. Cru. Arr. All Dep. Cru. Arr. All Dep. Cru. Arr.
PF/single-pilot 90 23 21 46 103 23 34 46 173 54 34 85
PM/
 Dep. remote 160 44 35 81 50 50 – – 0 0 – –
 Arr. remote 88 – – 88 0 – 0 0
Aircraft automation 144 44 30 70 192 62 39 91 144 44 30 70
ATC/ATM 52 8 21 23 52 8 21 23 52 8 21 23
Dispatch 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0
Flight planning 3 3 – – 3 3 – – 3 3 – –
Engineering 1 1 – – 1 1 – – 1 1 – –
Ground handling 4 4 – – 4 4 – – 4 4 – –
Fuelers 3 3 – – 3 3 – – 3 3 – –
Network density 0.58 0.39 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.33 0.50 0.39 0.39 0.20 0.20
Table 3  The nodal statistics of the Social Network Analyses (SNA) for the four most important operators
Standardised values =’. Dispatch, Flight Planning, Ground Handling and Fuelers were omitted in this Table
Nodal statistics (entire flight) Pilot flying/single-pilot Pilot monitoring/remote-
copilot
Departure/arrival
Aircraft automation ATC/ATM
Option MCO RCO Data-link MCO RCO Data-link MCO RCO Data-link MCO RCO Data-link
Centrality
 Degree’ CD’(ni) 0.21 0.22 0.46 0.39 0.14 0.21 0 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.14 0.12 0.14
 Closeness’ CC’(ni) 1.95 1.89 3.21 2.41 2.16 1.88 0 1.15 1.61 2.06 0.71 1.02 1.20
 Betweenness’ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.58 0.00 0 0.40 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Eccentricity’ CEcc’(ni) 1 1 2 1 1 0.96 0 1 1 1 0.96 0.97 1
 Information’ CI’(ni) 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.02 0 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.16
PageRank Prestige’ PR’(ni) 1 1 1 1 0.88 0.43 0.69 0.73 0.67 0.56 0.86 0.76 0.67
 Cognition, Technology & Work
1 3
The general shift from MCO to RCO is described in 
comparing the Pilot Monitoring (PM) to the corresponding 
remote-copilot. We can consider the remote-copilot as a sim-
ilar role to the PM. The remote-copilot is comparably less 
in contact with all other agents [CD’(Remote-Dep.) = 0.14] 
and is slightly less important [PR’(Remote-Dep.) = 0.88]. 
During arrival, the remote-copilot can access information 
from other agents less quickly [CC’(Remote-Dep.) = 2.16; 
CC’(Remote-Arr.) = 1.88], controls much less information 
flow during arrival [CI’(Remote-Dep.) = 0.12; CI’(Remote-
Arr.) = 0.02] and is less important [PR’(Remote-Arr.) = 0.43] 
than in departure. These differences might be caused by the 
fact that the remote-copilot supports the single-pilot on its 
own and does not need to communicate with any ground 
operators other than ATC, as it is the case during departure 
and arrival. This is especially apparent with betweeness cen-
trality. This value is much higher for the departure remote-
copilot [CB’(Remote-Dep.) = 0.58] than for any other agent. 
It does mean that others than him are more often connected 
between pairs of agents which are the ground operators dur-
ing flight preparations and handling on ground. The arrival 
remote-copilot does not need to communicate with other 
ground operators than ATC in normal situations. Hence we 
do not over interpret these small differences between depar-
ture and arrival. In general, the remote-copilot remains com-
parably resilient as the PM with alterations in the network’s 
position which make him less central.
In sum, these results point out that a data-link break-up 
critically affects flight safety by having lost the redundancy 
of ground support. This RCO specific support is anticipated 
to distributed workload in any off-nominal situation that 
potentially overloads the single-pilot. Hence, the data-link 
outage emergency has significant potential for injury, loss of 
life, and/or severe damage to aircraft, equipment, or infra-
structure (Burian 2008; Burian et al. 2005). UAVs apply 
several different graded solutions to compensate a data-link 
loss (Mouloua et al. 2001). First, a supervisory flight man-
agement of on-board automation automatically pursues a 
pre-programmed flight trajectory for short-term data-link 
outages. Second, the UAV can automatically activate a 
return-to-base function and land safely when the data-link 
is completely lost.
In general, data-link applications for RCO have to man-
age a considerable amount of data. This is only possible 
via Control and Non-Payload Communications (CNPC) 
links which enable highly reliable, low-latency, and secure 
two way communications but with usually low data rate 
requirements (Yong et al. 2016). They are currently used by 
UAVs. Hence these links are used for safety critical infor-
mation such as command and control information, aircraft 
status reports from air to ground, and sense-and-avoid data 
of UAVs. Nonetheless, a cryptographic latency problem 
remains that very high-speed communication with high 
bandwidth require a special hardware encryption whereas 
low latencies are difficult to achieve (Driscoll et al. 2017). 
RCO requires this type of data-link with rather low latencies. 
Taken together with the impacts on the network’s resilience 
and subsequent operational issue of high workload and no 
redundant recovery option RCO have to include a solution 
on how to mitigate a data-link loss.
The dual-graded solutions of UAVs can be transferred to 
a single-piloted airliner and combined with its automation 
technologies. When the data-link fails for a predefined short 
time period the aircraft systems’ monitoring could activate 
the supervisory flight management system to pursue the pre-
programmed trajectory. The nature of a loss of data-link is 
defined by a longer time period during which the system 
fails to re-establish a connection to ground. The single-pilot 
would always be alerted on data-link outage or failure. In 
latter case, the aircraft has to land as soon as possible to 
minimize the likelihood of an overload and incapacitation 
of the single-pilot in further course of flight. Hence, the 
single-pilot is required to declare an emergency and land 
the aircraft by an automated landing system at an adjacent 
airport. SNA finally complemented SOCA by analysing a 
loss of work function in RCO which result from the new 
type of technical failure of data-link break-up. The network’s 
resilience suffers being accompanied by a higher workload 
on the main operator (the single-pilot) which is why initial 
solutions have been proposed.
3  Conclusions
The present paper introduced a set of widely established 
CWA phases combined with SNA to refine reduced-crew 
concept in commercial aviation. In contrary to first-of-a-kind 
systems (Lundberg et al. 2018; Naikar et al. 2003) behav-
iours of the workers in the current system are already well 
known (Stanton et al. 2019). Since the aviation is shaped 
by legacy systems (Harris and Stanton 2010; Maier 1998) a 
reduction in crew requires both flight deck function alloca-
tion and advanced automation tools. The methods connect 
the higher-level evaluation with detailed design in the overall 
design process by providing design advice as for example for 
future monitoring systems. They extend the function alloca-
tion by an early theoretical evaluation of the network’s resil-
ience due to a loss of functions which can result among oth-
ers from new automation tools. In doing so, recovery options 
can be anticipated and implemented in the later technical 
development to solve legacy issues like pilot incapacitation.
WDA provides the foundation for having modelled the 
constraints of the problem space in which the (reduced) 
crew of the system under analysis operates (Stanton and 
Jenkins 2017). As in our example, the AH is considered to 
specifically evaluate the present work domain and check 
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where the system can be extended to fit future require-
ments of the reduced crew. Adding new purpose-related 
functions can become inevitable when different object-
related processes are assigned to automation likewise to 
compensate the crew reduction. This update of the socio-
technical system might be accompanied by an addition of 
physical objects in the workers’ environment. In RCO, the 
issue of the lost redundancy of a second pilot on-board 
including a possible single-pilot incapacitation requires a 
possibility to administer a recovery from such emergen-
cies which include a loss of control on airside. Hence, the 
object-related processes of pilot health monitoring, air-
craft systems monitoring, and passivation had to be added 
including health monitoring devices on the physical level. 
They complete the function of recovery. In this way, WDA 
completed establishing a ConOps, a function analysis of 
the system, and began to lay a base of an operating pro-
cedures specification and of allocating function for the 
reduced-crew configuration of an airliner.
ConTA and SOCA both allocate functions to the agents 
of RCO on a base of an analysis of current MCO (Stanton 
et al. 2016a). A high-level model of function allocation is 
accomplished which is further used in following theoreti-
cal evaluations. A first and very broad workload assessment 
can be made based on counting the numbers of work func-
tions conducted by one agent simultaneously. Of course, we 
refer to assess and evaluate mental workload empirically by 
standard methods in case of interest (Young et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, we retrieved the functional loadings on the 
agents from the SOCA–CAT to evaluate the social network 
of the possible interactions in RCO in normal situations and 
when the data-link is lost. SNA provided detailed results 
about the network’s resilience against a loss of data-link 
and about the characteristics of interactions each agents is 
exposed to. Data-link loss clearly poses a hazard for flight 
safety in RCO. These results can be further used to pro-
ceed with job and interface design. The requirements and 
boundaries of the work environment that captures all pos-
sible occurring situations are specified.
In general, all results of this analyses can be used for 
design advice and interface design in the subsequent design 
process. Here, the CWA-DT can be applied to integrate 
results in the overall design process. We have not conducted 
the other two phases of CWA yet because they focus on 
different design issues. STA mainly deals with operating 
procedures specification to additionally advice the design 
of interfaces (Naikar 2006; Stanton and Jenkins 2017). It 
investigates how activities can be conducted. WCA deals 
with investigating the operators’ behaviour that is required to 
complete the tasks. This last phase of CWA is based on the 
work requirements which were defined and analysed in the 
previous phases. Hence, it complements a target audience 
description and design advice. Both, STA’ and WCO’ design 
purposes become more important later on in the design pro-
cess and are out of the scope of the present paper.
As the present work strengthens the link between CWA 
and SNA, the issue of validity has to be raised against the 
background of a theoretical analysis and evaluation tech-
nique. As such, the subset of methods from CWA including 
SNA aims to analyse the work domain and allocate functions 
of a reduced-crew configuration of the system with respect 
to a possible loss of new automation technology. This is 
how we can apply SNA in the SOCA phase to construct 
interaction networks of the agents to obtain a preliminary 
risk assessment. This step is useful to investigate the effects 
on the agents’ interactional characteristics to any type of 
loss of (human and/or non-human) function(s) of the sys-
tem under analysis. If someone aims to study communica-
tions and their management in depth we recommend adding 
an observational scenario of the system under analysis at 
a later stage in design process. SOCA–CAT and SNA can 
only serve a model of a high-level evaluation of possible 
interactions which is nonetheless valuable to include them 
into early design stages.
SNA metrics themselves represent a form of analysis 
which has been not common in the CWA community yet 
(Baber et al. 2017; Houghton et al. 2015). The major criti-
cism is that the SNA nodal statistics can be reductionist in 
describing how actors and functions relate to each other in 
terms of interactions. Nonetheless, the method theoretically 
illustrates how the network structure inherent in possible 
interactions from SOCA can differ depending on factors like 
crewing and availability of work functions. The risks that 
one should take into account are the assumptions that have 
to be made to retrieve interactions as type of communication 
from the SOCA phase of CWA. When two or more agents 
conduct a work function it does not necessarily mean that 
they have to interact with each other (Baber et al. 2017). 
Hence, the different probabilities of agents engaging in any 
kind of communication to perform a work function might 
differ. The present analysis does not take it into account. 
SNA in combination with the SOCA phase represents a 
rather formal approach to model the boundaries of interac-
tions. Actual patterns of communications might deviate from 
these models are recommended to be investigated later in 
the design process.
Last but not least, the results of the modelling in this 
paper require validation from empirical human-in-the-loop 
simulations. For example, the Event Analysis of Systemic 
Teamwork (EAST) can be applied to model among others 
social networks of team performance in an observational 
study of system operations (Stanton et al. 2018). At this 
point, initial empirical investigation of single aspects in SPO 
of commercial airliners like workload quantification (Bai-
ley et al. 2017), collaboration tools for the ground operator 
(Lachter et al. 2017; Vu et al. 2018) match the anticipated 
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assumptions of higher workload without ground support. 
Unfortunately, none of the studies investigating commer-
cial RCO empirically provides a methodology like EAST 
to model the interactions to the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge. Thus, the advantage of the methodology of the present 
paper is as follows. Whereas the collaboration tools repre-
sent only a piecemeal suggestion on how to handle differ-
ent situations the CWA in combination with SNA address 
the whole sociotechnical system of imaginable future RCO 
before systems’ implementation. In doing so, the method 
enriches the design process by including issues which arise 
from de-crewing early into detailed design steps no matter of 
which nature they are. The three phases of CWA including 
SNA integrate different design issues in a structured way 
into an early stage of the design process of RCO: defining a 
ConOps, function analysis, function allocation, analysis of 
possible interactions, to parts operating procedures specifi-
cation, and a design advice in general. The proposed subset 
of methods identifies the requirements for new automation 
tools and enables to anticipate the effects of off-nominal 
and emergency situations on the overall system. In doing so, 
this work has drawn more attention to the design potential 
of the SOCA phase which has been a rather neglected phase 
of CWA (Stanton and Jenkins 2017). We hope to encour-
age taking up SNA as a core element into SOCA of CWA 
and giving SOCA more attention. The methodology fosters 
evaluating resilience in terms of the a network’s architecture 
between concurrent (mal)function allocations of a sociotech-
nical system (Houghton et al. 2015).
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